What has driven trade booms and trade busts in the past and present? We derive a micro-founded measure of trade frictions from leading trade theories and use it to gauge the importance of bilateral trade costs in determining international trade flows. We construct a new balanced sample of bilateral trade flows for 130 country pairs across the Americas, Asia, Europe, and Oceania for the period from 1870 to 2000 and demonstrate an overriding role for declining trade costs in the pre-World War I trade boom. In contrast, for the post-World War II trade boom we identify changes in output as the dominant force. Finally, the entirety of the interwar trade bust is explained by increases in trade costs.
I. Introduction
Over the past two centuries, the world has witnessed two major trade booms and one trade bust. Global trade increased at a remarkable pace in the decades prior to World War I as well as in decades following World War II. In contrast, global trade came to a grinding halt during the interwar period. What are the underlying driving forces of these trade booms and busts? The goal of this paper is to address this question head-on by examining new data on bilateral trade flows for a consistent set of 130 country pairs over the period from 1870 to 2000, covering on average around 70 percent of global trade and output. We explore three eras of globalization: the pre-World War I Belle Époque , the fractious interwar period (1921) (1922) (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) , and the post-World War II resurgence of global trade . Thus, the paper is the first to offer a complete quantitative assessment of developments in global trade from 1870 all the way to 2000. 1 Inevitably, any long-run view of international trade faces the notion that trade patterns can be driven by different reasons. For example, international trade during the nineteenth century is often viewed as being determined by relative resource endowments (Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, 1999) or differences in Ricardian comparative advantage (Peter Temin, 1997) . 2 More recently, international trade has been related to not only Ricardian factors (Jonathan Eaton and Samuel S. Kortum, 2002) but also to the activities of heterogeneous firms (Marc J. Melitz, 2003) . The challenge for a long-run view is therefore to find a unifying framework that accommodates a variety of divergent explanations for international trade. We invoke the gravity equation to help us resolve this issue by exploiting the fact that gravity is consistent with a wide range of leading trade theories. While technical details might differ across models, all micro-founded trade models produce a gravity equation of bilateral trade. In turn, all gravity equations have in common that they relate bilateral trade to factors within particular countries such as size and productivity, and factors specific to country pairs such as bilateral trade costs. The intuition is that gravity is simply an expenditure equation that arises in any general equilibrium trade model. It describes how consumers allocate spending across 1 We do, however, follow in the footsteps of other researchers that have looked at different periods in isolation. For instance, Antoni Estevadeordal, Brian Frantz, and Alan M. Taylor (2003) examine the period from 1870 to 1939. The work of Scott L. Baier and Jeffrey H. Bergstrand (2001) is the closest predecessor to our own. However, they only consider the period from 1958 to 1988. We also track changes in trade due to all trade costs while their data contained only rough proxies for freight costs and tariffs. 2 In addition, John C. Brown (1995) has found evidence of international trade prior to World War I being driven by product differentiation and imperfect competition.
countries-regardless of the motivation behind international trade, be it international product differentiation or differences in comparative advantage. In Section II below, we run standard gravity regressions and demonstrate that gravity exerts its inexorable pull in all three subperiods.
As a departure from previous work, we investigate the long-run evolution of trade costs.
These are all the costs of transaction and transport associated with the exchange of goods across national borders. We define trade costs in a broad sense, including obvious barriers such as tariffs and transport costs but also many other barriers that are more difficult to observe such as the costs of overcoming language barriers and exchange rate risk. Even though trade costs are currently of great interest (James E. Anderson and Eric van Wincoop, 2004; Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2000; David L. Hummels, 2007) , little is known about the magnitude, determinants, and consequences of trade costs. In particular, there has been very little work on consistently measuring all of the trade barriers over the last two waves of globalization and the one intervening spell of de-globalization. This paper is the first step in filling the gap on both counts of comprehensiveness and consistency.
Specifically, we derive a micro-founded measure of aggregate bilateral trade costs that is consistent with leading theories of international trade. We are able to obtain this measure by backing out the trade cost wedge that is implied by the gravity equation. This wedge gauges the difference between observed trade flows and a hypothetical benchmark of frictionless trade. We, therefore, infer trade costs from trade flows. This approach allows us to capture the combined magnitude of tariffs, transport costs, and all other macroeconomic frictions that impede international market integration but which are inherently difficult to observe. In Section III below, we show that an isomorphic trade cost measure can be derived from a wide range of leading trade theories-including the consumption-based trade model by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) , the Ricardian model by Eaton and Kortum (2003) , the heterogeneous firms model by Thomas Chaney (2008) and the heterogeneous firms model with non-CES preferences by Melitz and Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano (2008) . We emphasize that this approach of inferring trade costs from readily available trade data holds clear advantages for applied research: the constraints on enumerating-let alone, collecting data on-every individual trade cost element even over short periods of time makes a direct accounting approach impossible.
In Section IV, we take the trade cost measure to the data. We find that in the forty years prior to World War I, the average level of trade costs (expressed in tariff equivalent terms) fell by thirty-three percent. From 1921 to the beginning of World War II, the average level of trade costs increased by thirteen percent. Finally, average trade costs have fallen by sixteen percent in the years from 1950. After describing the trends in trade costs, in Section V we examine whether the trade cost measure is reliable. Our evidence suggests that standard trade cost proxies are sensibly related to our measure. Factors like geographic proximity, adherence to fixed exchange rate regimes, common languages, membership in a European empire, and shared borders all matter for explaining trade costs. These factors alone account for roughly 30 to 50 percent of the variation in trade costs. However, the three sub-periods exhibit significant differences, allowing us to document important changes in the global economy over time such as the growing importance of distance in determining the level of trade costs over time and the diminishing effects of fixed exchange rate regimes and membership in European empires.
In Section VI we return to the question of what drives trade booms and busts. We use our micro-founded gravity equation to attribute changes in global trade to two fundamental forces:
changes in global output and changes in trade costs. For the pre-World War I period, we find that trade cost declines explain roughly sixty percent of the growth in global trade. Conversely, we find that only thirty-one percent of the present-day global trade boom can be explained by the decline in trade costs. This latter finding is consistent with previous studies for the post-World War II period (see Baier and Bergstrand, 2001; John Whalley and Xian Xin, 2009 ). The comparison of the two trade booms suggests that major technological breakthroughs in the nineteenth century such as the steamship, the telegraph, and refrigeration may have been relatively more important than technological innovations in the second half of the twentieth century such as containerization and enhanced handling facilities. Finally, we find that the entire interwar trade bust can be explained by the precipitous rise in trade costs associated with the Great Depression, highlighting the critical role of commercial policy, the collapse of the gold standard, and the evaporation of trade credit at the time.
II. Gravity in Three Eras of Globalization
An ever expanding literature documents the applicability of gravity over the long run. (1)
where x ijt represents real bilateral exports from country i to j in time t; the α i and α j terms represent country fixed effects intended to capture differences in resource endowments, differences in productivity, and any other time-invariant country attributes which might determine a country's propensity for export or import activity; the y it and y jt terms represent gross domestic products in countries i and j; and z ijt is a row vector of variables representing the various bilateral frictions that limit the flow of goods between countries i and j and includes familiar standbys in the literature such as the physical distance separating countries.
We use expression (1) along with the trade and output data detailed in Appendix I to chart the course of gravity in three eras of globalization: the pre-World War I Belle Époque , the fractious interwar period (1921) (1922) (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) , and the post-World War II resurgence of global trade . The 27 countries in our sample include Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay. Figure 1 summarizes the sample graphically.
3 Finally, we incorporate measures for distance, the establishment of fixed exchange rate regimes, the existence of a common language, historical membership in a European overseas empire, 4 and the existence of a shared border. 5 Summary statistics and the results of this exercise of estimating gravity in the three sub-periods separately are reported in Tables 1 and 2 , respectively.
In Panel A of Table 2 , we estimate equation (1) by OLS, using GDP, the five variables proxying for trade costs mentioned above, and country fixed effects. The results are reassuring.
The coefficients on GDP-although different across the three eras of globalization-are precisely estimated and fall within the bounds established by previous researchers. Likewise, distance is found to be negatively and significantly related to bilateral trade flows. Fixed exchange rate regimes, common languages, and shared borders are all found to be positively and significantly associated with bilateral trade flows. We also note that these regressions confirm the emerging story on the pro-trade effects of empires, specifically the very strong stimulus to trade afforded by European empires in the pre-World War I period (Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2008) which slowly faded in light of the disruptions of the interwar period and the decolonization movement of the 1950s and 1960s (Head, Thierry Mayer, and John Ries, 2008) . Along with the proxies for trade costs, this specification includes year fixed effects, allows the 3 This sample constitutes, on average, 72% of world exports and 68% of world GDP over the entire period. We also note that the various sub-samples are highly balanced. Given the 130 country pairs in our sample, there are 14,820 possible bilateral trade observations (130 times 114 years) of which we are able to capture fully 99.9%. 4 For all intents and purposes, this may be thought of as an indicator variable for the British Empire. The sole exception in our sample is the case of Indonesia and the Netherlands. 5 Another obvious candidate is commercial policy, and especially tariffs. Only one consistent measure of tariffs is available for the period from 1870 to 2000 in the form of the customs duties to declared imports ratio as in Michael A. Clemens and Williamson (2001) . This measure seems to be a reasonably good proxy for tariffs in the pre-World War I and interwar periods. However, after 1950 and the well-known rise of non-tariff barriers to trade, this measure becomes unreliable, sometimes registering unbelievably low levels of protection. The measure also-somewhat paradoxically-becomes less readily available after World War II; the United Kingdom, for instance, stops reporting the level of customs duties in 1965.
country fixed effects to change over time, and omits the GDP terms due to collinearity. 6 The sign and significance of the remaining variables is remarkably consistent across the panels.
To conclude, the fundamental result of this section has been the consistency of gravity in determining international trade flows, both in the past and the present. This is a key result which we argue motivates a common gravity framework for the three eras of globalization. We develop such a framework in the following section.
III. Gravity Redux
Our goal in the remainder of the paper is to study two fundamental drivers of tradeoutput and trade costs. To undertake such an analysis, we now introduce a theoretical gravity framework that incorporates trade costs and that is consistent with many classes of trade models.
As we demonstrate above, the standard gravity equation (1) Bergstrand (1985 Bergstrand ( , 1989 Bergstrand ( , 1990 established the applicability of the gravity equation to a number of preference and substitution structures and to alternate models of international trade: the Heckscher-Ohlin factor endowments approach, trade based on monopolistic competition, and a hybrid model of different factor proportions among monopolistically competitive sectors. 8 Gene M. Grossman (1998, p. 29-30) neatly summarizes this situation: "Specialization lies behind the explanatory power [of the gravity equation], and of course some degree of specialization is at the heart of any model of trade…This is true no matter what supply-side considerations give rise to specialization, be they increasing returns to scale in a world of differentiated products, technology differences in a world of Ricardian trade, large factor
As a second step, we exploit the fact that these trade models predict similar gravity equations which suggest that trade booms and busts are driven by changes in output and changes in trade costs. In particular, we formally show that all the gravity equations can be solved for a common expression of implied trade costs. 9 These implied trade costs can be interpreted as the wedge between a hypothetical frictionless world as predicted by each model and the actual trade patterns observed in the data. We argue that these implied trade costs are an informative summary statistic to describe international trade frictions. In Section V, we also demonstrate this empirically.
(i) Gravity in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) derive the following gravity equation:
where W y is world output and i Π and j P are outward and inward 'multilateral resistance'
variables. The latter can be interpreted as average trade barriers. 1 ≥ ij t is the bilateral trade cost factor (one plus the tariff equivalent), and 1 > σ is the elasticity of substitution. In empirical applications, trade costs are typically proxied by variables such as bilateral distance and a border dummy. But it is difficult to find empirical proxies for the multilateral resistance variables.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) caution against the use of price indices since they might not capture non-pecuniary trade barriers. Instead, the procedure that has been adopted most frequently in recent gravity applications is to include country fixed effects.
As an alternative, we follow Novy (2009) 
. (2) is multiplied by its counterpart for bilateral trade from j to i, ji x , we obtain the product of all multilateral resistance variables on the right-hand side, 
We solve for the trade costs as the key parameters of interest. The parentheses on the right-hand side of equation (4) contain the product of two trade cost ratios. These ratios represent the extent to which bilateral trade costs ij t and ji t exceed domestic trade costs ii t and jj t . Finally, we take the square root to form their geometric average and subtract by one to get an expression for the tariff equivalent. The resulting expression is
where ij τ is the trade cost wedge that captures bilateral relative to domestic trade costs.
10
To grasp the intuition behind this trade cost measure, imagine the two extremes of a frictionless world and a closed economy. (2) differed from unity, the trade cost measure in equation (5) would not be affected. 10 Head and Ries (2001), Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) , and Head and Mayer (2009) derive a similar expression but assume trade costs are symmetric. We do not make that assumption. In addition, we derive the expression from a number of different theories, not only from the CES monopolistic competition model. They estimate the ratio of trade flows, whereas we solve for the implied trade cost wedge according to equation (5). We refer to the robustness check in Appendix II where we allow for stochastic measurement error in the trade data and where we also estimate a version of equation (4).
We have derived the trade cost measure in equation (5) (7) 1 1.
Comparing equations (5) and (7), it is obvious that (8) ,
where i w is workers' productivity in country i, j λ is a remoteness variable akin to multilateral resistance, and ij f are the fixed costs of exporting from country i to j.
12 γ is the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution from which productivities are drawn, with a high γ denoting a low degree of heterogeneity and 1 − > σ γ . Forming the ratio of domestic over bilateral trade flows
τ is a now function of both variable and fixed trade costs. Thus, under the assumptions of Chaney's (2008) model the interpretation of the trade cost wedge extends to fixed costs of exporting.
We note that for non-zero trade flows (as is generally the case in our sample), the heterogeneous firms model by Elhanan Helpman, Marc J. Melitz, and Yona Rubinstein (2008) is consistent with the same trade cost measure as in equation (9), that is,
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(iv) Gravity in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) also model heterogeneous firms. Firms face sunk costs of market entry, E f , that can be interpreted as product development and production start-up costs.
In contrast to Melitz (2003) and no fixed costs of exporting. The model is based on non-CES preferences that give rise to endogenous markups. More specifically, markups tend to be low in large markets with many competitors.
The multiple-country version of their model leads to the following gravity equation:
where δ is a parameter from the utility function that indicates the degree of product differentiation, with a higher δ meaning a higher degree of differentiation. (11) 1 1.
In contrast to
Ch ij τ in equation (9) (2003) applies. The intuition is that bilateral trade barriers prevent factor price equalization between two countries that trade with each other. If factor prices were equalized, final goods prices would also be equalized and neither country could overcome the trade barriers. In a world with a large number of goods and few factors it is, therefore, likely that one country will be the lowest-cost producer.
Trade in a Heckscher-Ohlin world would, thus, resemble trade in an Armington world and could be characterized by a standard gravity equation.
In summary, our trade integration measure ij τ is consistent with a broad range of trade models since they all lead to gravity equations that have a similar structure as equation (2). In a similar vein, Robert C. Feenstra, James R. Markusen, and Andrew K. Rose (2001) It turns out that the particular motivation behind foreign trade is not crucial to understand the role of bilateral trade frictions.
IV. Trade Costs over Time
We use equation (5) (7) and the Pareto parameter γ in equations (9) and (11), it is instructive to also consider estimates for those parameters. Eaton and Kortum (2002) 1921, and 1950 , so that they are not strictly comparable in terms of levels across periods. Our goal instead is to highlight the changes within a given period. We are also trying to avoid pressing too hard on the assumption that the substitution elasticity (or alternatively, the Fréchet or Pareto parameters) have remained constant over the entire 130 years under consideration.
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We weight these averages by GDP to reduce the influence of country pairs which trade infrequently or inconsistently. primarily generated by India which in its post-independence period simultaneously erected formidable barriers to imports and retreated from participation in world export markets. This India effect is most pronounced for former fellow members in the British Empire, that is, Australia, New Zealand, and Sri Lanka.
Most surprisingly, the decline in international relative to domestic trade costs in the second wave of globalization is mainly concentrated in the period before the late 1970s. Indeed, in the global and all sub-regional averages-save the Americas-trade costs were lower in 1980 than in 2000. In explaining the dramatic declines prior to 1973, one could point to the various rounds of the GATT up to the ambitious Kennedy Round which concluded in 1967 and slashed tariff rates by 50% and which more than doubled the number of participating nations. Or perhaps, it could be located in the substantial drops-but subsequent flatlining-in both air and maritime transport charges up to the first oil shock documented in Hummels (2007) . This phenomenon demands further attention but remains outside the scope of this paper.
V. The Determinants of Trade Costs
Having traced the course of trade costs, we now consider some of their likely determinants. This exercise serves two purposes. First, it addresses-albeit imperfectly-the natural question of what factors have been driving the evolution of trade costs over time. Second and more importantly, it helps further establish the reliability of our measure of trade costs-that is, are trade costs as constructed in this paper reasonably correlated with other variables commonly used as proxies in the literature? Below, we demonstrate that this is the case. We also refer the reader to Appendix II where we provide robustness checks confirming their reliability.
Trade costs in our model are derived from a gravity equation rather than estimated as is typically the case in the literature. Commonly, log-linear versions of equation (1) are estimated by substituting an arbitrary trade cost function for z ijt and using fixed effects for the multilateral resistance variables. Such gravity specifications, to the extent that the trade cost function and the econometric model are well specified, could be used to provide estimated values of trade costs.
In fact, as demonstrated above, such specifications are highly successful in explaining a significant proportion of the variance in bilateral trade flows. Nevertheless, there is likely a substantial amount of unexplained variation due to unobservable trade costs and, thus, potential omitted variable bias.
We consider a function for trade costs that is widely used in the gravity literature
where dist is a measure of distance between two countries, x is a row vector of observable determinants of trade costs, and ε is an error term composed of unobservables. We log-linearize equation (12). The determinants we consider are the same as those in Section II and include the distance between two countries, the establishment of fixed exchange rate regimes, the existence of a common language, membership in a European overseas empire, and the existence of a shared border. In all regressions, we include time-invariant country fixed effects as well as year fixed effects. 18 The reported regressions pool across all periods and then separate the data for the 130 dyads between 1870 and 1913, 1921 and 1939, and 1950 and 2000 . The results are reported in Table 3 .
Considering the pooled results first, we find that a one standard deviation rise in distance raises trade costs by 0.38 standard deviations. Fixed exchange rates, a common language, joint membership in a European empire, and sharing a border all decrease trade costs with the latter two coefficients being roughly double the estimated effect of fixed exchange rate or sharing a common language. This pooled approach demonstrates that standard factors that are known to be frictions in international trade are sensibly related to the trade cost measure. The results also
show that the trade cost measure determines trade patterns in ways largely consistent with the gravity literature covering more geographically comprehensive samples.
At the same time, the pooled approach masks significant heterogeneity across the periods.
Here, we highlight a few of these differences. One way to get a sense of the relative contribution of the five variables to the variation in trade costs is to compare the R-squareds from a battery of regressions as in the work of Kalina Manova (2008) . Specifically, one can generate an upper bound for the contribution of, say, distance by re-estimating (12) with only that variable but no other controls. Thus, the upper bound loads as much variation as possible onto distance. One can also generate a lower bound for the contribution of distance by using the difference between the R-squareds from the fixed effects specification with all variables of interest including distance-as in the corresponding panel of Table 3 -and a fixed effects specification with all variables of interest excluding distance. Thus, the lower bound represents the marginal contribution of distance to an otherwise full specification.
In Table 4 , we report the results of running such regressions and tabulating the Rsquareds for each variable in each sub-period. Thus, we find that distance can explain between 2 and 14 percent of the variation in trade costs in the period from 1870 to 1913. What is apparent from Table 4 is that the relative contribution of the five variables remains highly consistent across the three sub-periods, with distance potentially explaining the most variation and historical membership in European overseas empires the least variation. The results in Table 4 also confirm the increasing explanatory power of distance over time-and especially in the post-1950 period-and the decreasing explanatory power of fixed exchange rate regimes and the historical membership in European overseas empires hinted at above. 
VI. A Long-Run View of Trade Booms and Trade Busts
As we are interested in the growth of bilateral trade, we log-linearize equation (13) and take the first difference between years (denoted by Δ). This yields
Following Helpman (1987) and Baier and Bergstrand (2001), we split the product of outputs into the sum of outputs and output shares, ii y x / goes down so that the contribution of the fourth term to bilateral trade growth becomes negative. This can be interpreted as a trade diversion effect that is consistent with the models by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) , Eaton and Kortum (2002), and Chaney (2008) . 22 We consider the growth of bilateral trade between the initial years (1870, 1921 and 1950) and the end years (1913, 1939 and 2000) of our three sub-periods. We compute GDP-weighted averages across dyads and report the results in Table 5 below. To be clear about our approach, we do not estimate equation (19) . Instead, we decompose the growth of bilateral trade conditional on our theoretical gravity framework. The purpose of the decomposition is to uncover whether bilateral trade growth is mainly associated with output growth or changes in bilateral trade costs. We are also interested in how the relative contribution of changes in output and trade costs differs across the three sub-periods. We note that our results do not depend on the value of σ-even if it changes over time. The reason is that the first, second and fourth terms on the right-hand side of equation (19) are given by the data. As predicted by the models outlined in Section III, the trade cost term follows as the residual.
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As can be seen from the final column in Table 5 Another contribution of this paper has been-both in terms of theory and data-to consistently and comprehensively track changes in bilateral trade costs by using a newly compiled dataset on aggregate bilateral trade. The gravity model has been successful in the past, especially in providing estimates of the marginal impact of a range of trade costs. We build on this success to show how a large variety of general equilibrium models of international trade can be used to calculate a trade cost wedge akin to the Solow residual in growth models or the 'labor wedge' used in structural macro-labor models (e.g., Robert Shimer, 2009 (6) is computed on the basis of historical trade data. It might be a concern that these trade data are subject to measurement error, especially in the earlier period. Suppose that measurement error u enters the trade data as The second term denotes a set of country-pair fixed effects. Equation (4) implies that these country-pair fixed effects correspond to the trade cost parameters, (t ij t ji )/(t ii t jj ), multiplied by (1-σ). As trade costs are likely to change over time, we allow the fixed effects to be time-varying. As annual fixed effects would leave no degrees of freedom, we choose quinquennial variation instead (denoted by the s subscript). Other subperiod lengths, say, biennial or decadal, would also be possible but would lead to similar results. As the final step, we generate predicted values for the dependent variable of regression (A.2) based on the estimated coefficients, and then we construct a predicted trade cost measure, ijt ∧ τ , based on equation (6). By construction the predicted measure strips out measurement error as it does not include the regression residual that corresponds to ε ijt .
We run regression (A.2) for all available observations that involve the U.S. and Canada, including those during the world wars (4137 observations). Standard errors are robust and clustered around country pairs. The resulting regression has a high R-squared in excess of 95 percent. In Figure A .4 we plot the actual trade cost measure, τ ijt , based on σ=8 for the U.S.-Canadian case against its predicted counterpart. We also plot the 99 percent confidence intervals around the predicted measure (computed with the delta method). The actual and predicted trade cost measures are generally not significantly different. We therefore deem it unlikely that measurement error severely distorts our trade cost measure. The confidence intervals are somewhat wider for the first half of the sample with clear spikes in the vicinity of World War II, suggesting more measurement error in the early period, but they are very tight after 1950. In this robustness test we present estimates by sub-period for the underlying gravity model used in our decomposition exercise. Equation (4) can be rewritten as:
To estimate this equation, we substitute for the trade cost function from equation (12), add year fixed effects and a white noise error term at the country-pair year level. Results are provided in Table A .1. The R-squareds are excellent, never explaining less than 99 percent of the variance. The signs of the coefficients on the trade cost proxies are as expected from Table 2 . In the postWorld War II period, and the interwar period, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the size terms are equal to one. In the pre-World War I period, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the size term for country j is one but we do so for country i. This result could easily be due to the weakness in the GDP data in that period. In any case, when we form the log of product of the size terms in this period, the estimated coefficient is 1.167 and we cannot reject the hypothesis that this coefficient is one (p-value = 0.23). The main message is that the gravity equation above, which is consistent with all the models explored earlier, is reliable and provides a good basis for the decomposition exercise. Sigma trending upwards from 6 to 10 Sigma trending downwards from 10 to 6 1870-1913 1921-1939 1950- 1870-1913 1921-1939 1950-2000 1921-1939 1950-2000 0.6445 0.6243 0.7939 
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